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INTERPRETING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.†
ABSTRACT
Justice Holmes famously observed that “[g]reat cases . . . make
bad law.” The problem may be especially acute in the domain of
national security, where presidents frequently interpret their own
powers without judicial review and where executive precedents play a
large role in subsequent interpretive debates. On the one hand, some
of the historical assertions of presidential authority that stretch
constitutional and statutory language the furthest seem hard to
condemn in light of the practical stakes. On the other hand, to credit
the authority of executive precedent risks leaving the president
dangerously unbound.
To address the conundrum posed by executive precedent, this
Article proposes a two-tiered theory for the interpretation of
presidential powers. Framed as an analogy to a position in moral
philosophy known as “threshold deontology,” two-tiered interpretive
theory treats rules that restrict executive power as normally inviolable,
not subject to a case-by-case balancing analysis. Analogously to
threshold deontology, however, two-tiered theory also recognizes that
when the costs of adherence to ordinary principles grow exorbitantly
high, extraordinary interpretive principles should govern instead and
should result in the upholding of broad presidential power. For
reasons that the Article explains, resort to extraordinary reliance on
second-tier justifications for assertions of sweeping executive
authority involves a legal analogue to “dirty-handed” moral conduct
and should be labeled accordingly. And executive precedents set in
extraordinary, second-tier cases should not apply to more ordinary
ones. Through its conjunction of elements, two-tiered interpretive
theory furnishes analytical and rhetorical safeguards against executive
overreaching, but also allows accommodations for truly extraordinary
cases.
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INTRODUCTION
With characteristically pithy perspicacity, Justice Holmes
1
famously worried that “[g]reat cases . . . make bad law.” The problem
with great cases has two aspects. First, as Holmes noted,
extraordinary practical pressures may distort judicial judgment about
2
how to resolve particular high-stakes controversies. Second, rules of
decision framed for great cases—even if appropriate to their exigent
facts—may threaten to contaminate the resolution of future, more

1. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See id.
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3

ordinary cases. To quote another splendid Justice, a rule crafted for a
rare and regrettable emergency may thereafter “lie[] about like a
4
loaded weapon,” risking future damage to previously long-settled
legal, political, and moral ideals.
Although Justice Holmes warned about great cases with judicial
decisionmaking in mind, the problems to which he called attention
can arise just as acutely with respect to constitutional and statutory
interpretation by the executive branch, especially within the domains
of foreign policy and national security. Because disputes about the
outer limits of presidential power to keep the nation safe and to
manage international affairs seldom ripen into justiciable
5
controversies, the president—aided by a team of lawyers—frequently
6
functions as the principal precedent-setter in these areas. Rarely, if
ever, does the president claim a power to violate the law. Instead, the
president, with assistance from the White House or Justice
Department legal staff, issues opinions justifying assertions of
executive authority under the Constitution and laws of the United
7
States. Some of the precedential decisions thus reached come in the
kind of great cases to which Justice Holmes referred. Ready examples
emerge from the actions of President Abraham Lincoln in the early
days of the Civil War, when he concluded that the emergency
rendered it constitutionally permissible for him to take steps that
would almost surely have been legally impermissible in less
8
extraordinary times. Equally precedential decisions come when
presidents and administration lawyers determine the applicability of
precedents set in genuinely great cases to less exigent circumstances.
3. Cf. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1097 (2003) (“[T]here is a strong probability that measures
used by the government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal system even after the
crisis has ended.”).
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
5. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 436–38 (2012).
6. See id. at 460 (noting the frequency of executive-branch reliance on executive
precedent, even in the absence of acquiescence by other branches, and observing that “there are
plausible grounds for even nonexecutive actors to credit patterns of executive practice, at least
in some circumstances”).
7. For a caustic critique of the legal analysis thus produced, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 98–116 (2010). For a rejoinder, see Trevor
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1692 (2011) (book review)
(arguing that Professor Ackerman’s “oversimplified account obscures the constraints built into
the current institutional arrangement”). For further discussion, see infra note 62.
8. See infra notes 42–57 and accompanying text.
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Professor Bruce Ackerman thus notes the tendency of presidents
to justify actions that would otherwise be patently illegal or
unconstitutional by arguing that executive precedent either glosses or
9
displaces otherwise applicable norms. He caricatures the resulting
form of legal argument as follows: it is constitutionally permissible for
the president to act unilaterally, despite the appearance of legal
constraints, because “[t]hat’s what Abe Lincoln did in the early
months of the Civil War [and] that’s what FDR did during the Great
10
Depression.” According to Professors Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule, our system has so evolved that law no longer meaningfully
11
constrains the president, though political checks continue to operate.
In this Article, I propose a response to the problems posed by
great cases involving claims of presidential power—and executive
precedents construing presidential powers very broadly—in the
domains of war and national security. My proposal depends on an
analogy between constitutional law and moral theory. In my view, the
“threshold deontological” position that some moral prohibitions
12
cease to bind absolutely when the costs of adherence grow excessive,
and the similar idea that public officials sometimes appropriately
13
acquire morally “dirty hands,” can illuminate thinking about
presidential powers and the proper role of precedent in defining
them. The underlying premise of these approaches, which I shall
summarize under the rubric of “two-tiered morality,” holds that
morality operates on two levels. First, there is the level of ordinarily
applicable moral rules, such as those, for example, that forbid lying,
killing, and the deliberate infliction of harm. Second, there is a level
at or above which the costs to others of adhering to the applicable
rules grow so exorbitant that it becomes morally untenable to do so.
Under such circumstances, a morally conscientious official has no
choice but to do what ordinary morality forbids. Nevertheless, the
underlying prohibition remains unmodified, and an official, though
having done what she morally had to do, has acted regrettably and
may even have done a “wrong,” as reflected in the metaphorical
suggestion that she thereby gets dirty hands.
9. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 73.
10. Id.
11. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 14–15 (2010).
12. See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
13. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
160, 161–62 (1973).
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Pursuing the analogy afforded by threshold deontology, I argue
in this Article that we should conceptualize the rules of constitutional
and statutory interpretation applicable to claims of presidential power
as possessing a bifurcated structure. Ordinary rules, which apply in
ordinary cases, may, with relative frequency, yield the conclusion that
the president is constrained in ways that the president, for policy
reasons, would not wish to be constrained. But in highly exigent cases,
I argue, different rules of constitutional and statutory interpretation
govern. When consequence-based imperatives possess sufficient
urgency, it is right to conclude, as a matter of law, that the president
can do some things that would be flatly illegal or unconstitutional
14
under the ordinarily applicable rules. This conclusion holds even in
situations in which part of the purpose of the usual rules may be to
circumscribe officials’ discretion and to stop them from doing what
they deem wise, expedient, or even prudentially necessary on a caseby-case basis. Nevertheless, by analogy to the moral wrongs that
threshold deontology sometimes regards as lesser evils, some
presidential actions that are justified only pursuant to the second-tier
principles governing exigent cases should be regarded as lesser legal
evils that are regrettably in breach of ordinary legal and constitutional
ideals that emergency does not eradicate. By marking extraordinary
claims of executive authority as tainted in this way, we would equip
ourselves with the best intellectual, legal, and political tools for
stopping what was lamentably necessary in one case from evolving
into normal operating procedure in others. Going forward, I shall
thus argue, we should distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary
claims of presidential power; limit extraordinary claims to truly
extraordinary cases; parse precedents much more closely to ascertain
whether they correctly apply this distinction; and accord strong
precedential authority only to past presidential actions and practices
that emerge as adequately justified under the appropriately
applicable rules.
The novelty of my proposal that we embrace a two-tiered theory
of constitutional and statutory interpretation inheres in its status as a
legal theory, framed to fit and rationalize much, though not all, of
historical and current U.S. legal practice, and in the resources it
14. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257, 1257 (2004) (“The Constitution itself embraces an overriding principle of constitutional
and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of construction for the document’s
specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific
constitutional requirements.”).
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provides for identifying and challenging executive overreaching. A
large political philosophical literature discusses the emergency
powers, if any, that a well-designed constitution would assign to the
15
executive. By contrast, my aim and method are “interpretive” in the
16
sense in which Professor Ronald Dworkin uses that term: I seek to
offer an account that not only fits our historical and contemporary
practices for gauging the scope of executive authority, but also casts
those practices in the best normative light and thus offers attractive
guidance for the future. That guidance crucially involves a strategy of
identifying even justified invocations of emergency interpretive
principles as inherently regrettable or even dirty-handed and of
resisting the spread of principles framed for great cases to more
17
ordinary ones, even in the field of national security. By invoking
moral and political philosophy to shape the development of a legal
interpretive theory, this Article also distinguishes itself from
arguments that officials confronted with emergencies are morally
18
justified in acting extralegally.
The Article’s interpretive methodology, as informed by an
analogy to moral philosophy, also distinguishes it from constitutional
scholarship that has debated the scope of presidential war powers on
exclusively historical and functional grounds, often without reference
to issues of statutory interpretation. To neglect statutes and issues
involving their interpretation is myopic. As Professors David Barron
and Martin Lederman have shown, Congress frequently enacts
legislation that restricts or might be interpreted to restrict presidential

15. That literature notably includes JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374–
79 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, The
Prince, in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 1, 56–57 (Max Lerner ed., Luigi Ricci trans.,
Random House 1950) (1532); and CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS
ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1922).
Distinguished recent contributions include DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW:
LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); NOMI CLAIRE LAZAR, STATES OF EMERGENCY
IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (2009); and HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE:
THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER (1989).
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239, 255–58 (1986) (maintaining that proposed
interpretations must be judged by the sometimes competing criteria of “fit” and normative
attractiveness).
17. Cf. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1404 (1989) (observing that “[e]mergency rule has become permanent”); Paulsen, supra note 14,
at 1257–60 (proposing special interpretive principles for cases of constitutional necessity without
addressing problems involving the contamination of nonemergency cases by principles framed
in ones of genuine exigency).
18. See generally, e.g., Gross, supra note 3.
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authority, even with respect to the Commander-in-Chief power. We
need a theory addressing the proper interpretation of such legislation.
The Article unfolds as follows: Part I first elaborates the
constitutional intuition that extraordinary interpretive principles
should apply to a few high-stakes cases, then juxtaposes that intuition
with grounds for justified anxiety that allowing legal accommodations
for great cases may create bad law. Against the background of that
juxtaposition, Part II introduces threshold deontological moral theory
as a potential source of analogical guidance. Applying the analogy
that threshold deontology affords, Part II also offers a provisional
statement of, and defends, a two-tiered approach to statutory and
constitutional interpretation. Part III moves from a largely conceptual
defense of the idea of a two-tiered interpretive theory to the
development of a framework for analyzing particular cases. More
specifically, Part III frames the questions to which a fully specified
two-tiered theory would need to supply answers, as illustrated by
discussions of concrete cases. Part IV considers the proper application
of two-tiered theory to past executive precedents, including those
emerging from “great cases,” and offers a set of prescriptions for
ensuring that reliance on precedent, and especially executive
precedent, does not subvert the analytical structure that two-tiered
theory otherwise mandates.
I. OUR CURRENT PREDICAMENT REGARDING CLAIMS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER
At least in academic circles, the notion has gained astonishingly
broad currency—including respectful consideration even from those
who ultimately reject it—that the president possesses substantially
unlimited powers, especially in the domain of national security. With
some academic support, the George W. Bush administration
defended a sweeping view of inherent presidential powers related to
20
national defense. Those powers, the administration argued, lay
19. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947–48 (2008).
20. The Bush administration not only claimed unilateral authority to prosecute a war in
Iraq without congressional authorization if it so chose (though it later opted to seek, and won,
such authorization), see LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 215–30 (2d ed., rev. 2004),
but also maintained that Congress was wholly impotent to enact legislation restricting the
president’s authority to respond to perceived national security threats, see, e.g., Memorandum
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Deputy
Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military
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beyond the reach of Congress to regulate. Professors Posner and
Vermeule offer a more qualified claim about the capacity of law to
restrict the president, but also one that sweeps more broadly with
respect to subject matter. According to them, “law does little to
21
constrain the modern executive” at all, as illustrated and established
by past “showdowns” in which other branches have acceded to claims
22
of presidential power.
The view that the president is almost totally unconstrained by
law seems to me to border on the unintelligible. By constituting the
office of president, and the surrounding network of other offices with
distinctive responsibilities, law establishes what it means to be
23
president. Given what it means for someone to hold the office of
president under a Constitution that also creates a Congress and a
judicial branch, and confers individual rights, the president cannot,
unilaterally, raise tax rates on the wealthy, confer life-tenured
judgeships on men and women whom the Senate will not confirm, or
incarcerate citizens who have not taken up arms against the United
States or been convicted of crimes. As a conceptual matter, the
alternative to a legally constrained president is not a legally
unconstrained president, but rather no president at all (as opposed to
24
a constitutional dictator or supreme potentate, for example).

Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 214 (Sept. 25,
2001). For examples of academic discussions roughly in line with the Bush administration’s
position, see generally Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional
Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That
Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807 (2006);
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other
Means]; and John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002). For
critical discussion of the Bush administration’s positions regarding executive power, see
generally, JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); and CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE
RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2007).
21. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 15. For a detailed critique of the empirical
claim that executive power has become substantially unconstrained, see generally JACK
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).
22. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 67–83.
23. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 986–89
(2009).
24. See id. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential
Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013) (identifying
mechanisms of legal constraint on the president).
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Much more plausible is the notion that presidents, although
constrained by law in many respects, are—and frequently should be—
able to construe their powers very expansively, or to read limits on
their powers as narrow to the point of vanishing, in times of perceived
emergency. In this Part, I shall first develop the constitutional
intuition that special interpretive rules should apply, with the effect of
relaxing restrictions on presidential power that otherwise would
govern, in great, emergency, or high-stakes cases. I shall then
elaborate the concern that this intuition should be rejected based on
25
the Holmesian premise that “[g]reat cases . . . make bad law.”
Finally, I shall explain how the conjunction of point and counterpoint
with respect to these matters frames the challenge that the remainder
of this Article addresses.
A. The Constitutional Intuition That Special Rules Apply to the
Determination of Presidential Powers in Exigent Cases
Justice Jackson’s much-celebrated concurring opinion in
26
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the leading Supreme
Court case on presidential powers, highlighted the significance of
determining whether the president acts with the authorization of
Congress, acts in a context to which Congress has not spoken, or acts
27
in the teeth of a congressional prohibition. This is an extremely
helpful
categorization, as
reflected
in
the
widespread
acknowledgment that Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence
28
provides the framework for analysis of presidential power. As
Youngstown illustrates, however, an important prior question will
often involve the interpretation of a statute. In Youngstown, a
majority of the Justices read a statute giving some powers to the
president as impliedly denying him others. In other cases, by contrast,
the Supreme Court has construed seemingly limited grants of
presidential power as tacit approvals of broader assertions of
29
executive authority.

25.
26.
27.
28.
familiar
power).
29.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
See id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (referring to “Justice Jackson’s
tripartite scheme” as “the accepted framework” for evaluating claims of executive
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677–80 (1981).
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In considering whether great, emergency, or high-stakes cases
call for the recognition of presidential powers that could not be
persuasively justified if the stakes were lower, it may help to start
with cases of statutory interpretation. Although I do not wish to
overstate my claim, in statutory cases we may have a clearer sense of
what “ordinary” interpretation would be—that is, of how we would
construe statutory language in the absence of a plausible claim of
exigency—than we would in pure cases of constitutional
interpretation, in which tradition teaches that “we must never forget,
30
that it is a constitution we are expounding.”
Even in statutory cases, no general claim about the nature of
interpretation can wholly escape controversy. For example, textualists
and “new textualists” endorse one set of methodological principles,
31
while purposivists embrace another. Nevertheless, these and nearly
all other theories of statutory interpretation define themselves partly
in opposition to the pervasively pragmatic view that statutes should
always be interpreted to reach whatever result would have the best
32
consequences, all things considered. In contrast with such thoroughgoing pragmatism, other theories impose significant constraints, even
though they characteristically permit or require some sensitivity to
consequences.
For purposes of argument, let us assume, then, that the adherents
of one interpretive theory or another would sometimes regretfully
conclude that a statute either fails to give the president a power, or
precludes the president from exercising a power, that they think it
desirable for the president to have. Such a conclusion, we might say,
would reflect the outcome of ordinary statutory interpretation. And
ordinarily we would expect those with interpretive authority to live
with the conclusion that ordinary statutory interpretation—conducted
pursuant to their methodology, whatever that methodology might
be—generates.
In some cases, however, it may seem obvious that both the
Supreme Court and executive officials have strained to reach the
conclusion that the president is not relevantly constrained, despite
30. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
31. For a highly illuminating overview of the overlap and divergence of these two
approaches, see generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 50 (2003) (defining
pragmatism as “judg[ing] proposals by the criterion of what works,” as measured by the
“concrete consequences for a person’s happiness and prosperity”).
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obstacles that nearly any interpretive theory would interpose. It is
hard to give examples, because what would count as straining or
stretching depends on the theory with which one begins, and I do not
mean to identify a preferred theory against which to measure
deviations. But I suspect that nearly everyone may sometimes feel
sympathy for those who have struggled to rationalize conclusions that
would be difficult to justify within their ordinarily applicable theories.
For many, an example may come from the effort of then-Attorney
General Robert Jackson to read pertinent statutes as not barring the
destroyers-for-bases trade with Great Britain that President Franklin
Roosevelt effected when Britain stood virtually alone against Nazi
33
Germany. Among a series of legal obstacles, the gravest stemmed
from a statute enacted in 1917 that barred the transfer of “any vessel
34
built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war” to a nation at war.
Jackson found the prohibition inapplicable because the over-age
destroyers were not initially “built, armed, or equipped with
any . . . intent or with reasonable cause to believe that they would ever
35
enter the service of a belligerent.” If we believe this interpretation of
the statutory prohibition to be strained, but nevertheless justified
under the circumstances, it may be a sense of the exigency of the
36
situation that moves us, and we may be provoked to ask whether,
and if so how, exigency could matter to a question of statutory
interpretation. In so saying, I assume that all statutory interpretation
allows for some degree of sensitivity to consequences, but that a
special sense of straining arises because the ordinary limits have been
reached. We may feel a similar tug of legal impulses in considering
actual and possible questions of presidential authority under the
Constitution in any of Justice Jackson’s categories. Once again, I
recognize that different interpreters will have different constitutional

33. See Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op.
Att’y Gen. 484 (1940). For discussion of the episode, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 194–200 (2010); and
Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1042–47. For detailed criticism of the legal arguments on
which the Roosevelt administration relied, see Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, A Divorce Waiting To
Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the Law of Neutrality, 1935-1941, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 413, 473–
81 (1996).
34. See Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, supra
note 33, at 494 (quoting Act of June 15, 1917, Pub L. No. 65-24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 222).
35. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
36. For a discussion of the surrounding exigency, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 105–09 (First Mariner Books ed. 2004).
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theories. It is also pertinent that the decisionmakers who determine
the bounds of lawful presidential authority are likely to be executive38
branch officials, rather than courts. Even so, I imagine that a
39
genuine interpretive process will occur, not just a pragmatic
40
calculation of what the president can get away with, and that
concerned citizens will also apply one or another theory to gauge the
president’s lawful authority. If the question is whether the normal
application of an interpretive theory would justify a claim of
presidential authority, for most theories, the answer surely will be
“no” in some cases. For many, Youngstown furnishes an example:
President Harry Truman had neither statutory nor inherent
constitutional authority to seize the nation’s steel mills under the
41
circumstances.
But it should again prove easy to think of cases in which courts as
well as executive officials have strained to uphold assertions of
presidential authority—and in which adherents of nearly any
constitutional theory may feel sympathy for their efforts. Some of
President Lincoln’s actions at the outset of the Civil War, as
42
explained in his July 4 Message to Congress, exemplify the kind of
reasoning that I have in mind. During the period between the firing
37. Prominent examples include originalism, see generally, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1999); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Professor
John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcing approach, see generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Dworkin’s prescription
to give a “moral reading” to language incorporating moral values, see RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW 1–15 (1996); and what Professor David Strauss has called common law
constitutional interpretation, see generally David L. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
38. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV.
689, 724–25 (2008) (rejecting the view that executive officials and other nonjudges are
unaffected by constitutional argumentation); Morrison, supra note 7, at 1714–15 (describing
interpretive norms followed by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)).
40. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1404–05
(2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11) (examining a rational-choice theory
argument that “presidents follow the law not out of any normative obligation or the more
specific duty to faithfully execute the laws but only when the cost-benefit metric of compliance
is more favorable than that of noncompliance”).
41. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
42. President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTERPRETING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

10/9/2013 3:59 PM

359

on Fort Sumter on April 12 and the first subsequent convening of
Congress on July 4, 1861, Lincoln, among other extraordinary actions,
ordered payments out of the Treasury to support an enlarged army
43
and navy, notwithstanding the provision of Article I, Section 9 that
“[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
44
of Appropriations made by Law.” He also authorized the suspension
45
of the writ of habeas corpus, even though the constitutional
46
authorization for suspensions comes in Article I, which lists the
powers of Congress, not in Article II, which vests executive power.
When Chief Justice Taney then ruled that the president lacked
suspension power and ordered the writ to issue in Ex parte
47
Merryman, Lincoln directed Union officers to defy the Chief
48
Justice. Once again, we may have some instinct—as Lincoln did—
that it was right to interpret the Constitution to let the president rise
to the emergency, even if that conclusion requires extraordinary
interpretive liberties.
Even if instinctively sympathetic toward Lincoln, we might
incline toward saying that, in at least some instances, the justification
for his actions had to come from morality or necessity, not
constitutional law. In a letter explaining some extraordinary actions
during his presidency, Thomas Jefferson famously wrote that
49
obedience to law is not necessarily a public official’s highest duty. So
we might, quite intelligibly, relegate questions about whether the
president is justified in claiming powers that are difficult to sustain by
ordinary interpretive methods to the realm of political morality and
50
ask whether the president ought to defy the law.

43. For a description and analysis of the steps that President Lincoln took before
convening Congress, see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION: THE NATION, THE
PRESIDENT, AND THE COURTS IN A TIME OF CRISIS, 17–19 (2003); and Barron & Lederman,
supra note 19, at 997–1005.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
45. Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 998–99.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
47. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
48. Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 999.
49. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in BASIC WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 682–83 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944).
50. Oren Gross adopts substantially this approach in his much-discussed article, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? See generally Gross, supra
note 3. For one extended discussion of Gross’s article, see David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey:
Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026–
30 (2006).
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Before doing so, however, we should heed an interesting
ambivalence in the way that Lincoln set up his defense of asserting
extraordinary powers. His July 4 message to Congress divided the
actions that he had already taken during the secession crisis into two
categories. After reciting a number of his initiatives, Lincoln said that
51
“[s]o far all was believed to be strictly legal.” He then began a
discussion of actions falling within what he took to be a separate
category, apparently involving steps that may not have been “strictly
legal,” but that he nevertheless regarded as constitutionally
52
permissible under the exigent circumstances.
Only after introducing the distinction between actions that were
strictly legal and those that he appeared to regard as justifiable only
because of crisis-based imperatives did Lincoln advance his famous
defense of unilateral presidential authority to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus. Noting that critics had maintained “that one who is
sworn to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ should not
53
himself violate them,” Lincoln countered: “[A]re all the laws, but
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest
54
that one be violated?” Having framed this question, Lincoln insisted
that it had not actually arisen. When the Constitution was properly
read, he argued, it gave the executive the authority to suspend the
writ when suspension was a practical necessity: “[A]s the provision
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed
the framers . . . intended, that in every case, the danger should run its
course, until Congress could be called together; the very assembling
of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the
55
rebellion.”
Although the train of Lincoln’s thought is not entirely clear, his
remarks can be interpreted to suggest that constitutional legality
operates at two levels. There is the ordinary level—what Lincoln
categorized as the domain of the “strictly legal”—within which it
would suffice to note the dictates of a law or constitutional provision
that appears to speak precisely to the case at hand. Yet Lincoln also
appears to contemplate another level, applicable in extraordinary

51. President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, supra note 42, at
428 (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 429.
53. Id. at 429–30.
54. Id. at 430.
55. Id. at 430–31 (footnotes omitted).
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cases, in which rigid adherence to a single law or constitutional norm
would have potentially grave, adverse implications for superveningly
important constitutional values. In sufficiently momentous cases,
Lincoln implied, strict legality may sometimes yield to a conception of
what the Constitution authorizes or requires under extraordinary
56
circumstances. As Lincoln put it, “I felt that measures, otherwise
unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to
57
the preservation of the nation.”
Here lies the germ of a two-tiered theory of executive power and
of the appropriate interpretation of statutes and constitutional
provisions bearing on executive power. Stated provisionally, the
theory would be this: Within a two-tiered legal framework, two kinds
of overrides of ordinarily applicable rules may be permissible when
the costs of adhering to those rules grow exorbitantly high. First,
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation may yield. Second, if no
statutory authority can be found, and if ordinarily applicable
constitutional principles would preclude the recognition of a
presidential power, exigency may trigger principles of constitutional
interpretation that provide the president with adequate constitutional
grounds for doing something that is not “strictly legal,” because it
violates applicable principles, but that is nevertheless ultimately
constitutionally justified, as measured on another scale.
This theory not only captures what I expect to be widely shared
intuitions about the appropriate interpretation of the president’s
powers in the cases that I have discussed, but also echoes with other
doctrines in constitutional law. Insofar as individual rights are
concerned, we may have an example of two-tiered constitutional
thinking in cases governed by strict judicial scrutiny and the
58
compelling interest test. Under this test, courts enforce rights up to,
but not above, the point at which countervailing governmental
59
interests grow compelling. Although not necessarily based on
56. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 60 (“[W]here Jefferson, like Locke, saw
emergency power as a weapon outside and beyond the Constitution, Lincoln suggested that
crisis in some sense made it a constitutional power.”).
57. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 42, at 281 (emphasis added).
58. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1281–82. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict
Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007) (discussing the historical origins and varying
interpretations of the compelling interest test).
59. See Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 807–08
(2007) (arguing that the strict scrutiny test gauges whether genuine rights have been overcome
by competing considerations).
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constitutional considerations, the necessity defense in criminal law
may similarly reflect the premise that ordinarily applicable legal and
moral rules are subject to override in exigent circumstances: the
necessity defense generally applies when a defendant’s conduct was
necessary to prevent a greater evil and no specific legal justification
60
or excuse applies. We may even have a notion of extraordinary
constitutionality applicable to situations in which Congress and the
president act in concert under Justice Jackson’s first Youngstown
61
category. But we do not have any comparably worked out notion
regarding presidential interpretations of statutes or presidential
power unsupported by congressional enactments. Once again, my
provisional suggestion is that the elaboration of such a notion could
substantially advance thought about constitutional law and statutory
interpretation involving presidential powers. It could do so by
clarifying why the law might occasionally tolerate what would
otherwise be legally intolerable on the ground that it is a lesser legal
evil, not an unproblematically justifiable application of a unitary,
mutually reinforcing set of legal principles.
B. A Competing Worry
With the provisional case for recognizing that special rules of
statutory and constitutional construction apply to emergency cases
now having been laid out, it is time to recall Justice Holmes’s worry
that great cases—and ad hoc intuitions about how great cases ought
to be decided—risk making bad law. As I emphasized earlier, the
problem may inhere partly in the need for courts to make pressured
judgments on such cases’ peculiar facts, but it also involves the
operation, and occasions for the extension, of precedent. The cause
for concern may grow especially acute, moreover, when the president
and lawyers in the executive branch not only establish, but also apply,
62
the central precedents. This concern has two aspects. The first is that
60. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). See generally George C. Christie, The Defense
of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975 (1999)
(discussing the necessity defense).
61. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be
said . . . to personify the federal sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)).
62. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 88 (asserting that the “stream of authoritativelooking opinions” produced by the OLC and the White House Counsel on the scope of
presidential authority “is produced under conditions that allow short-term presidential
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great cases such as those that I have discussed will establish
precedents that are expressly cited and applied in more ordinary
cases. The second is that acknowledgment of presidential authority to
assert extraordinary powers in exigent cases involving national
security will support patterns of analysis that categorically exempt
claims of presidential authority from ordinary norms of constitutional
and statutory interpretation.
An example from 2011 may illustrate the latter ground for
anxiety. When the Obama administration initially claimed
constitutional authority to participate in air attacks in Libya without
congressional authorization, officials argued that, as a number of
executive precedents demonstrated, the Constitution granted the
president unilateral power to order limited military operations, short
63
of war, that he believed to be in the national interest. Thereafter, a

imperatives to overwhelm sober legal judgment”). In a response in which he dismisses
Ackerman’s account as “oversimplified,” Dean Trevor Morrison emphasizes institutional
restraints within the OLC. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1692. Yet even Morrison does not deny
that the “OLC’s written opinions tend to be protective of executive power.” Id. at 1715.
According to Morrison, of the 245 publicly released OLC opinions between the beginning of the
Carter administration and the first year of the Obama administration, “193 opinions (79%)
found in favor of the White House’s position without significant limitation, twenty (8%)
provided a more mixed answer . . . , and thirty-two (13%) went predominantly against the White
House.” Id. at 1717–18. Morrison believes that “the rate at which [the OLC’s] written opinions
say yes to the President can be highly misleading . . . because many of OLC’s no’s” are tendered
orally and “never result in written opinions.” Id. at 1719. But the written opinions appear to
have a disproportionate precedential significance. A July 2010 OLC opinion expressly affirms
that “OLC opinions should consider and ordinarily give great weight to any relevant past
opinions of Attorneys General and the Office” and that they “should not lightly depart from
such past decisions.” See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1453 (2010) (quoting Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Attorneys of the Office, Re:
Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 2 (July 16, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Authority To Use Military Force in Libya 6
(Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.
The cited precedents included a “bombing in Libya (1986), an intervention in Panama (1989),
troop deployments to Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 1994 and 2004), air
patrols and airstrikes in Bosnia (1993–1995), and a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia (1999).” Id.
at 7. The memorandum articulated two limiting principles on the president’s power: First,
substantial national interests must justify the operations. Id. at 10. Second, the president may
not have the power unilaterally to order operations that would amount to a “war” under the
Declare War Clause. See id. In determining that Libya did not rise to that level, the
memorandum relied heavily on the Haiti and Bosnia examples. See Memorandum from
Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric
Holder, Att’y Gen., supra, at 9, 13.
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64

further issue arose under the War Powers Resolution, which
provides that presidents must terminate any commitment of U.S.
Armed Forces to “hostilities” within sixty days unless Congress has
“declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of
65
United States Armed Forces.” At this point, relying almost wholly
on executive precedent, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh
argued that the involvement of U.S. forces in air operations against
Libyan forces did not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of
66
the War Powers Resolution. This otherwise tendentious construction
rested almost wholly on past executive precedents established via
previous presidentially mandated commitments of military personnel
to Lebanon in 1983, Grenada in 1983, the Persian Gulf from 1987 to
1988, and Somalia in 1993. In those cases, Koh noted, the executive
concluded that “hostilities” did not occur, despite the presence of
thousands of U.S. ground troops, combat, casualties, and a high risk
67
of escalation. According to Koh, these precedents, although never
considered by any court, demonstrated that the term “hostilities” as
used in the War Powers Resolution does not apply “when U.S. forces
engage in a limited military mission that involves limited exposure for
U.S. troops and limited risk of serious escalation and employs limited
68
military means.”
The premises of Koh’s precedent-based argument are familiar,
but also unsettling. However one judges the specific arguments of the
Obama administration, previous administrations have cited executive
precedent to justify assertions of unilateral executive authority to do
nearly anything that the president has deemed desirable in the name
of national security, up to and including the initiation of war in every
69
practical sense of the term. The thought that past executive
precedent would plausibly support presidential claims of unilateral

64. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
65. See id. §§ 1543(a)(1), 1544(b).
66. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. 7 (June 28, 2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State).
67. See id. at 15 & nn.15–16.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Probably the most dramatic example of an administration actually acting upon a claim
of unilateral executive authority based largely on past executive precedent—on which the
George W. Bush administration in turn relied in the OLC Memorandum of September 25,
2001—involved entry into the Korean War. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The
George H.W. Bush administration also claimed an independent executive authority to
prosecute a war in the Persian Gulf, though it ultimately procured congressional authorization
before doing so. See FISHER, supra note 20, at 171–72.
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authority to initiate and prosecute a major and protracted war—for
70
the Korean War does indeed supply such a precedent —ought to give
71
pause. An executive branch unbounded in national security matters
by any legal limits that it has not chosen to acknowledge would
deviate sharply from traditional notions of constitutional legality and
72
the ideal of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the idea that past executive
practice—some of it developed under circumstances of genuine
exigency—helps define the scope of current presidential authority is
not easy simply to reject.
In considering the relevance of historical practice to
contemporary assessments of the president’s war powers, those who
resist claims of substantially unfettered presidential power confront
an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, it is hard, maybe impossible,
to gauge presidential authority without reliance on historical practice
73
and precedent. In many respects, the text of the Constitution is
vague, and the original public meaning often appears either
comparably vague or uncertain. Under these circumstances, nearly all
agree that historical practice can constitute a gloss on the

70. At the time of the Korean intervention, Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued not
only that the president had constitutional authority to commit U.S. troops unilaterally, but also
that this authority lay beyond Congress’s power to regulate. See Barron & Lederman, supra
note 19, at 1060–61. For critical discussion of the Truman administration’s decision not to seek
congressional authorization, see FISHER, supra note 20, at 97–100. Fisher concludes that “[e]ven
if a case could be made that the emergency facing Truman in June 1950 required him to act
promptly without first seeking and obtaining legislative authority, nothing prevented him from
returning to Congress and asking for a supporting statute for retroactive authority.” Id. at 100.
71. But see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 5 (“Executive government is best in
the thin sense that there is no feasible way to improve upon it, under the conditions of the
administrative state.”).
72. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Goldilocks Executive, 90
TEX. L. REV. 973, 1001–07 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11) (arguing in
support of traditional constitutional constraints on the president’s national security powers).
73. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 70 (1990) (describing the significance of “historical
precedent that may be thought of as quasi-constitutional custom” (emphasis omitted));
SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 18 (describing how “life under the Constitution began,” early in
constitutional history, “to define the meaning of the Constitution”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997–1002 (2008) (explaining how
“showdowns” between branches of government create precedents that influence future
expectations and interactions between the branches). For an analysis of the proper role of
nonjudicial precedent in settling separation-of-powers issues, see generally Bradley & Morrison,
supra note 5; Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).
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constitutional text. Especially when historical practice is reasonably
consistent across presidential administrations, it may capture
75
accreting lessons about practical imperatives in an evolving world.
On the other hand, in the domain of presidential powers, for all
but the few who believe that Article II was originally intended and
understood to give the president essentially limitless authority with
76
respect to national security, and that this allocation of power is
desirable, it is difficult not to think that some precedents for
assertions of presidential authority have gone too far. Indeed, looking
to the future, those who believe that the president should be subject
to any significant checks may view precedent-based reasoning as
77
more nearly the problem than the solution to a problem. Some of
the troubling precedents involve claims of unilateral presidential
authority that would persist even in the case of an attempted
78
congressional
prohibition.
Others
assert
latitudinarian
interpretations of statutes, including the War Powers Resolution,

74. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 418 (“With some variations, the Supreme
Court, executive-branch lawyers, and academic commentators have all endorsed the significance
of such practice-based gloss.”); see also, e.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
414 (2003) (“Although the source of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not
enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the
Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our
foreign relations.’” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)
(“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and
acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in
pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (characterizing historical
practice as a “gloss” on presidential power).
75. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at viii (observing that accretions of power to the
presidency have been necessary “to meet the great crises” of U.S. history and “to overcome the
tendency” of the separation of powers to promote “inertia”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5,
at 428, 455–56 (discussing Burkean and related grounds for according significance to historical
practice).
76. See, e.g., Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means, supra note 20, at 174. A
majority of war-powers scholars appear to take the view that the founding generation believed
that presidents could not resort to military force without congressional authorization except in
response to a sudden attack. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3–5 (1993); FISHER, supra note
20, at 8, 12; William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 699–701 (1997); see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 696
(concluding that “there is surprisingly little Founding-era evidence supporting the notion that
the conduct of military campaigns is beyond legislative control and a fair amount of evidence
that affirmatively undermines it”).
77. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 73.
78. For a survey of these precedents, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 951–1098.
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either to confer authority on the president or at least not to preclude
79
actions that the president wants to take.
In response, it is easy to say that emergency powers should be
reserved for emergencies. But as history shows, there is a very real
problem of normalization: powers created for emergencies spill over
their originally intended banks and become the norm. If so, the
solution to one problem—recognition of extraordinary presidential
powers that seem necessary under conditions of genuine exigency—
may have created another.
The question is whether there is a way to conceptualize and
cabin emergency interpretive powers so that they do not become the
norm, especially in a domain in which the executive branch is
frequently the leading creator and interpreter of precedents. In my
view, an analogy to positions in moral philosophy will suggest the
outlines of an affirmative answer.
II. AN ANALOGY FROM MORAL PHILOSOPHY
At the very least, important analogies exist between law and
morality. If we take those analogies seriously, it will be sensible to ask
whether moral theory might illuminate the situation of someone who:
(1) believes that the president both is and ought to be subject to
statutory and constitutional restrictions that can be identified through
ordinary rules of statutory and constitutional interpretation in
ordinary cases; yet (2) also believes that exceptions might be
warranted when the president’s exercise of a normally forbidden
power might achieve enormous benefits or avert extraordinarily dire
results; and yet (3) further worries that it might prove analytically,
psychologically, or politically impossible to stop emergency-based
interpretation of executive power, if it is allowed, from expanding
beyond its justifiable domain and becoming the operative norm in
other cases. If such illumination can be found, it would most likely
come from a moral theory that, analogously, posits the existence of
moral norms that, though ordinarily unyielding, can be overcome in
exigent cases, but only in exigent cases that are somehow narrowly
defined and duly, though not excessively, stigmatized. Threshold
80
deontology meets these specifications.
79. One such example is the Obama administration’s precedent-based interpretation of the
War Powers Resolution. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
80. For discussions of threshold deontology and of the leading criticisms directed against it,
see EYAL ZAMIER & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 41–56 (2010); and
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A. Threshold Deontology
Threshold deontology begins with the premise that people have
rights, rooted in their status as separate persons, that are not
reducible to or derived from considerations of overall social welfare.
But threshold deontology distinguishes itself from Kantianism and
other absolutist theories by positing that some rights-based
constraints on individual and governmental action hold only until the
81
costs of adherence grow exorbitant. At that point, a discontinuity
occurs: consequentialist imperatives take practical precedence over
82
otherwise inviolable principles. Although conceptual logic does not
dictate precisely where the relevant thresholds lie, defenders of
threshold deontology have sometimes appealed to the idea of a
“catastrophe” as providing at least an illustration of the need for
deontological principles sometimes to give way, if not a specification
83
of the point at which they would do so.
Crucial to threshold deontology is its recognition of a category of
cases in which consequence-based considerations take moral, actiondictating precedence over individual rights that nevertheless retain
their status as rights: exigency does not eradicate rights, even in cases
of exigent emergency, when the violation of those rights is warranted,
all things considered. If such a category can exist, it is probably
because, as the philosopher Thomas Nagel has written, two distinct
kinds of moral reason exert strong claims on us. One is deontological

Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Dec. 12, 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethicsdeontological.
81. See THOMAS NAGEL, War and Massacre, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 53, 56 (1979)
(acknowledging that “it may become impossible to adhere to an absolutist position” when
“utilitarian considerations favoring violation are overpoweringly weighty and extremely
certain”); Alexander & Moore, supra note 80 (noting the distinction between threshold
deontology and more absolutist positions).
82. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 10 (1978) (explaining that even absolute
norms have boundaries and exceptions); JOHN RAWLS, Fifty Years After Hiroshima, in
COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 566–67 (Samuel Freedman ed., 1999) (noting that even under a “strict
interpretation,” human rights might give way “in times of extreme crisis”); Michael S. Moore,
Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 329 (1989) (arguing that “moral absolutes”
can be overridden “when th[e] consequences are horrendous enough”).
83. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30 n.* (1974) (declining to
consider whether “side constraints,” i.e. rights, might “be violated in order to avoid catastrophic
moral horror”); Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74,
91 n.29 (1994) (“Warfare creates an atmosphere of emergency and catastrophe in which
ordinary deontological constraints begin to lose their grip.”).
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or rights-based; the other, consequentialist or loosely utilitarian.
According to Professor Nagel, rights-based or deontological moral
theories generally provide the best overarching explanation of our
considered moral judgments and should therefore be preferred. But
the pull of consequentialist impulses does not wholly disappear, and,
in cases of great consequence, conflicts can occur. Because rights exist
apart from consequentialist imperatives, there is no common medium
in which one can define the limits of the other. We therefore cannot
say that considerations of overall welfare define or limit rights by
marking their outer conceptual boundaries. We can say, however,
that rights are sometimes overridden by concerns about consequences
and that it may therefore be the lesser evil to violate one or another
moral norm. Nevertheless, because the relevant norms are not
effaced, neither are the rights that they define, and—in one version of
threshold deontology—a person who violates such rights has done a
85
wrong, even if that wrong is warranted under the circumstances.
Political philosopher Michael Walzer offers a partially parallel
86
account. According to Walzer, moral principles that are not
primarily consequentialist mark some actions as absolutely required
and others as absolutely forbidden. Like threshold deontologists, he
acknowledges that situations may arise in which adherence to moral
norms would impose excessive costs, especially in cases involving
officials responsible for public security and welfare. In such cases,
Walzer maintains, the ordinarily applicable norms are overridden.
Nevertheless, he insists, the ordinary norms do not cease to apply,
87
and an official who violates them thereby acquires “dirty hands.”
B. Parallels in Legal Interpretation
If the analogy afforded by threshold deontology has value for
legal and constitutional theory, its utility will emerge along two
dimensions. First, the analogy may help to illuminate how it might be
that our notions of constitutional legality include elements that may
sometimes come into conflict, or at least apparent conflict, with one
84. THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS, supra note 81,
at 75, 83–86; see also NAGEL, supra note 81, at 53–55; ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 498 (1981).
85. See NAGEL, supra note 81, at 67 (observing that even if “one has no choice but to do
something terrible” because of the intolerable consequences of not doing so, “[i]t does not
become all right”).
86. See Walzer, supra note 13, at 161–64.
87. Id. at 161.
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another. Second, threshold deontology might provide resources for
determining what to do, and also for characterizing the actions that
88
are dictated, in cases presenting such conflicts.
In my view, the existence of deep tension among fundamental
legal norms is nearly self-evident in many high-stakes, emergency
cases. On the one hand, we equate constitutional legality with
adherence to rules, principles, or constraints that are not reducible to
case-by-case determinations of what would be best under the
circumstances, all things considered. Although nearly any theory of
statutory or constitutional interpretation is likely to be applied in
89
practice in a way that is context-sensitive, every interpretive theory
that is not avowedly pragmatist will insist that to engage in
interpretation is to do something other than to calculate what would
have the best consequences in every case. On the other hand, as much
as we believe in fidelity to constitutional norms, most of us also
90
accept the premise that the Constitution is “not a suicide pact” and
that it ought not be so interpreted, no matter what ordinary principles
91
might dictate, as to promote genuinely disastrous consequences.
Most of us may have similar instincts within the domain of statutory
interpretation, in which a number of longstanding canons guide
92
interpreters away from untoward and absurd results.
If the duality that I have posited between imperatives to show
fidelity to individual constitutional and legal norms and to avoid
severely adverse impacts on the overall constitutional order exists,
then we might still think that cases of conflict call for an ordinary
balancing judgment in which one principle is deemed to outweigh
another in the circumstance presented. In ordinary cases of balancing,
88. Cf. MANSFIELD, supra note 15, at 204, 255 (maintaining that Lockean constitutional
theory “contains the extraconstitutional within the constitution” and that “the American
Constitution . . . constitutionalize[s] necessities in the manner of Locke” (emphasis omitted)).
89. This may be especially true when the interpreters are executive officials who are
subject to a variety of acutely practical and political pressures, especially insofar as their
functions involve national security. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW
AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 35 (2007) (observing that OLC opinions
do not always aspire to be “politically neutral rulings [like those] from a court”).
90. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
91. But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1299, 1299–1300, 1319 (2004) (questioning whether the Constitution should always be construed
to avoid severely harmful or even self-destructive results).
92. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003)
(“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that
judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given application would
otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results.”).

FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INTERPRETING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

10/9/2013 3:59 PM

371

we may apprehend no deep conflict of values, and certainly no
tragedy, and may see no reason to invoke notions of apology, regret,
or dirty hands. In my view, however, a more perspicuous portrayal of
constitutional law characterizes it as capable of generating dilemmas
analogous to those that threshold deontology depicts within morality.
The reason for adopting a dilemma-acknowledging account of
constitutional legality has to do with what Professor Frederick
93
Schauer has termed “the asymmetry of authority.” If we accept, as
94
we ought to, that nearly all rules are over- or underinclusive, the
question arises why any rulemaking authority might want to subject
officials—including
the
president—to
duty-establishing
or
constraining rules at all, rather than simply authorize them to do
whatever would be best under the circumstances. A part of the
answer involves distrust. Although individual officials, including the
president, may think that they could achieve better results by
deviating from the rules that the law has imposed, the law-creating
authority may have imposed the rules precisely because it distrusted
95
officials’ capacity to make unconstrained, case-by-case judgments.
This, roughly speaking, is the situation that I imagine to exist when a
president claims extraordinary interpretive liberties—as, for example,
Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt did in the cases that I discussed
96
above.
Nevertheless, as those cases may illustrate, unforeseen and
potentially catastrophic situations can materialize in which deviations
from strict legality are necessary, or reasonably thought to be
necessary, lest disaster occur. Although the obligation of fidelity to
specific, constitutionally and statutorily established legal norms
remains unaltered, consequence-based pulls of obligation to the
overall legal order may in rare cases achieve a supervening legal
97
force. If such cases exist, as I believe they do, then threshold
deontology suggests an apt conceptualization of how officials ought to
93. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 128–34 (1991).
94. See id. at 31–34.
95. See id. at 130–33; cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439–40 (2011) (describing how ex ante rules allow lawmakers
to grant decisionmaking power to an agent while constraining how the agent exercises her
discretion).
96. See supra notes 33–35, 42–43 and accompanying text.
97. Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, supra note 49, at 684 (“An officer
is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one who should do it in cases for which they
were not intended, and which involved the most important consequences.”).
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proceed: it may sometimes be constitutionally permissible or even
obligatory for officials to violate constitutional or statutory norms
that do not cease to apply. Or, adapting Lincoln’s formulation, we
might say that although an official’s deviation from applicable norms
98
was not “strictly legal,” what the official did was nevertheless legally
right and even legally mandatory, in light of the consequences that
99
the deviation was necessary to achieve or avert. Nevertheless, if the
analogy of threshold deontology is illuminating, then an official who
deviates from the strictly legal norms that ordinarily apply, even if
legally justified in having done so, will nonetheless have the legal
equivalent of morally dirty hands. Officials who honor the law ought
not claim entitlements to behave in ways that are not strictly legal and
set a precedent for other officials to do so as well. The fact that their
doing so is the lesser evil, and even the lesser legal evil, does not
make their actions wholly and unproblematically “all right” from a
100
legal perspective.
C. Contrasts with Other Theories of Presidential Power
If the position can be sustained that there can be constitutionally
justified deviations from constitutional and statutory norms—
typically involving cases in which consequentialist imperatives
override the rules that would normally determine what an official
legally ought to do—several contrasts would define the location of
this two-tiered theory in debates about constitutional and statutory
interpretation. First, the two-tiered view, although otherwise agnostic
regarding the best general theory of statutory or constitutional
interpretation, rejects any theory that characterizes all interpretation
as reflecting a single, unified, and harmoniously continuous set of
interpretive principles. Some such theories would deny either the
101
existence of or the need for emergency principles. Others would
portray all legal interpretation as occurring along a sliding scale, on
which practical considerations and imperatives always influence
interpretation, with the extent of influence varying in degree as the
98. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
99. Cf. BENJAMIN A. KLEINERMAN, THE DISCRETIONARY PRESIDENT: THE PROMISE
AND PERIL OF EXECUTIVE POWER 184 (2009) (arguing that presidential “action outside of and
especially against the Constitution” can “become constitutional” when necessary to national
survival (emphasis omitted)).
100. Cf. supra note 85.
101. Gross calls this approach “the Business as Usual model.” See Gross, supra note 3, at
1043–44.
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102

significance of interpretive consequences rises or falls. In contrast
with these positions, two-tiered theory is discontinuous. It recognizes
one set of principles for ordinary cases and another set for
extraordinary cases. Only when the consequences rise very
dramatically does a shift occur to the extraordinary principles that
could constitutionally justify what otherwise would be unequivocal
constitutional wrongs.
Second, two-tiered interpretive theory denies that a president
who
claims
extraordinary
powers
necessarily
acts
extraconstitutionally by asserting an entitlement—rooted either in
morality or necessity—to act without the authority, and in violation,
of the law. In defending the position that emergency powers should
be conceptualized as extraconstitutional, Professor Oren Gross relies
heavily on an interest in creating the proper incentives for official
103
action. In his view, it is better for a president who engages in
extraordinary action, unjustified by ordinary legal principles, to
acknowledge outlaw status and petition the public for forgiveness.
Otherwise, the temptation for officials to intrude recklessly on civil
liberties in the name of national security might grow too large.
In my estimation, this theoretical approach mischaracterizes
what happens—including what is experienced by both officials and
the public—in the kind of cases for which two-tiered theory
postulates the existence of extraordinary norms. When President
Lincoln ordered executive officials to pay money out of the Treasury
despite the absence of a congressional appropriation, or to defy a writ
of habeas corpus issued by the Chief Justice, he did not ask those
officials to join him in acting wholly outside the law. To equate his
actions with a temporary coup d’état—or the response of Congress
and the public as acquiescing in one—would radically misrepresent
what I imagine to be the self-understanding of all relevant parties.
Lincoln exercised powers granted to him by the Constitution as
104
appropriately interpreted pursuant to a two-level theory. Indeed, in
exercising those powers Lincoln may well have discharged his
constitutional duty to take care that the laws were faithfully executed
102. See id. at 1059 (describing a “model of interpretive accommodation” that “seeks to
apply ordinary rules in times of crisis, but to change the scope of such rules by way of
emergency-minded interpretation”).
103. See id. at 1096–1133 (propounding and defending an “Extra-Legal Measures model” of
emergency governmental powers).
104. See LAZAR, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that questions about appropriate conduct by
officeholders are “institutional questions”).
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and to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution under
105
extraordinary circumstances. The powers that Lincoln claimed were
dangerous ones, requiring deviation from ordinary constitutional
norms, but they nonetheless furnished a valid constitutional
106
justification for his actions under the circumstances. Indeed, when
extraordinary claims of executive authority come before courts,
courts should sometimes uphold those claims as a matter of law. I
believe this to be true, for example, with regard to most of the actions
that Lincoln explained and defended in his July 4 Message to
Congress and also with regard to President Franklin Roosevelt’s
107
destroyers-for-bases deal.
Third, two-tiered interpretive theory, as framed in light of the
analogy to threshold deontology, differs from Professor Michael
Paulsen’s theory that the text of the presidential oath gives the
president the duty, which implies a corresponding power, to do
whatever is necessary to “preserve, protect, and defend the
108
Constitution.”
In contrast with Paulsen’s theory, two-tiered
interpretive theory does not claim to be either originalist or strictly
textualist. The defense of two-tiered theory resides in a mix of its
capacity to explain constitutional intuitions that most of us would be
109
unwilling to renounce and its normative attractiveness. In further
contrast with Paulsen’s theory, two-tiered theory is not limited in
application to cases involving existential threats to the United States

105. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1263 (asserting that the presidential oath gives the
president the duty as well as the power to take reasonably necessary measures to preserve the
nation from existential threats).
106. The proposal of Professors Charles Fried and Gregory Fried—to analogize the conduct
of presidents who have justifiably violated normally applicable legal norms to “civil
disobedience,” see CHARLES FRIED & GREGORY FRIED, BECAUSE IT IS WRONG: TORTURE,
PRIVACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR 148–58 (2010)—invites similar
objections. The analogy fails to explain how a president who violated legal norms that would
clearly apply unless emergencies were legally relevant could act with the authority or even with
the apparent authority—in the eyes of the subordinate officials to whom presidential directives
issue—of law. There may be some presidential directives that would lack either actual or
apparent authority, but President Lincoln’s would not have numbered among them.
107. I thus believe that Chief Justice Taney erred by ruling in Ex parte Merryman that
President Lincoln lacked authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus at a
time of extraordinary exigency when Congress was not in session and thus unavailable to
authorize a suspension. See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–48, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861)
(No. 9487).
108. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8; see Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1263.
109. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
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or imminent threats of the loss of many lives from foreign attack.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Paulsen’s theory is framed
exclusively as one of empowerment. By contrast, two-tiered theory
incorporates conceptual and rhetorical resources for marking
invocations of extraordinary principles as inherently suspect, even
dirty-handed, and for resisting the spread of precedents established
by emergency cases to less exigent ones.
D. The Limits of the Analogy to Threshold Deontology
Although threshold deontology offers a helpful analogy for the
development of a two-tiered theory of legal interpretation, it could of
course be questioned whether threshold deontology is the best moral
111
theory or even a tenable one. Largely for the reasons advanced by
Nagel, which I briefly summarized above, moral theories that
distinguish between the rights-based norms applicable to ordinary
cases and the consequentialist imperatives that very occasionally
override such norms seem more persuasive to me than do single-track
theories. I am strongly drawn to the view that life sometimes presents
moral dilemmas in which any course of action entails moral costs and
that what is morally obligatory under the circumstances could be
aptly characterized as a lesser evil.
I have not, however, attempted to argue specifically in favor of
threshold deontology as the preferred form of moral theory. Even if it
were within my competence to contribute to the literature on moral
philosophy, my current purposes make such an effort unnecessary.
The analogy of moral analysis to legal interpretive theory is only an
analogy. It is wholly possible that a position in moral philosophy
could suggest an attractive approach to legal interpretation even if it
failed to provide the best framework for thinking about purely moral
issues.
The most serious threat to the utility of the analogy that
threshold deontology provides for assessing approaches to legal
interpretation might appear to lie in the argument, most prominently
110. Although Paulsen is slightly elusive about when “the constitutional principle of
necessity” would apply, he appears to link it to the imperative of “defend[ing] the fundamental
survival of the United States and its people.” Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1290.
111. For sustained criticism, see Larry Alexander, Deontological Constraints in a
Consequentialist World: A Comment on Law, Economics and Morality, JERUSALEM REV.
LEGAL STUD., Aug. 2011, at 75 [hereinafter Alexander, Deontological Constraints]; and Larry
Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2000) [hereinafter
Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold].
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advanced by Professor Larry Alexander, that threshold deontology is
112
According to Alexander, threshold
conceptually incoherent.
deontologists lack the resources to identify, in advance, the points at
which one set of governing principles gives way to another and to
113
explain why the thresholds lie exactly where they do.
In considering Alexander’s argument, it bears noting that his
objection would vanish if the analogy that I proposed were to a
theory that offered the same prescription as threshold deontology for
rule-based moral analysis until the point at which that approach
became exorbitantly costly, but that presented itself as a sophisticated
114
form of rule consequentialism. Such a theory could potentially
explain why rule-based moral decisionmaking would tend to promote
the best overall consequences in ordinary cases but affirm that the
115
calculus shifts above some threshold. Accordingly, even if threshold
deontology were conceptually incoherent, the analogy that I wish to
draw could rely instead on a form of two-tiered consequentialism with
almost precisely identical behavioral prescriptions.
I do not believe, however, that threshold deontology is
incoherent in the disqualifying sense of precluding reasoned,
rationally defensible moral decisionmaking. As a matter of practical
116
necessity, all moral reasoning must begin with moral conviction. I
cannot reason morally without testing moral claims against moral
117
beliefs that I already hold. And if one’s unshakable convictions
commit one to deontology in ordinary cases, but the Kantian demand
to adhere to ordinary principles of right even if the heavens should
fall strikes one as literally unbelievable in cases of almost certainly
impending catastrophe, then one must reason from those starting
points. In marking the thresholds at which ordinary principles cease
to control, one must be prepared to give reasons, but within any

112. See generally Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, supra note 111.
113. See id. at 905–10
114. See id. at 910–11.
115. For an example of two-tier consequentialism, see R.M. Hare, Rules of War and Moral
Reasoning, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 166, 174–78 (1972) (arguing that moral thought needs to
operate on at least two levels, with first-order thinking normally being rule-based rather than
employing case-by-case utility calculations, and with second-order thinking—by which ordinary
norms are defined, defended, and adjusted—being uncompromisingly utilitarian).
116. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 67 (2011) (“[W]e cannot justify a
moral judgment . . . without relying on further moral convictions or assumptions.”).
117. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 64–72 (1998).
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moral system the capacity to give more reasons will at some point run
118
out.
In anticipation of decision in cases of moral conflict, Alexander
maintains that threshold deontologists must either offer algorithmic
specifications of what becomes permissible under which
circumstances or accept the conclusion—which he thinks
119
disqualifying—that their theory requires “arbitrary” judgments. But
this objection depends on questionable assumptions about what
constitutes unacceptable arbitrariness. For example, in Alexander’s
view, even a carefully considered decision, based on an assessment of
all pertinent factors, would apparently fall within the condemnation if
all of the considerations were not capable of reduction to a common
currency. If, however, there simply is no common currency—as
threshold deontologists maintain—and if one does the best one can to
deliberate and explain a conflicted moral judgment, then I am
doubtful that the charge of arbitrariness is a perspicuous one.
At bottom, Professor Alexander’s argument relies on an
undefended assumption that moral reality somehow satisfies the
natural human craving for algorithmically correct answers, capable of
statement in advance, to all moral issues. I see no reason to credit that
assumption. To put the point differently, and to anticipate an issue
that will arise recurrently in the remainder of this Article, I do not
think it incumbent on either threshold deontologists or proponents of
two-tiered legal theories to incorporate within their theories a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying the thresholds that
would justify deviations from ordinarily applicable moral or
interpretive principles. At some point, rules and principles must
depend for their application on a faculty of judgment that is not itself
120
rule-governed; otherwise, the demand for rules for the application
121
of rules would descend into infinite regress. The more that can be
said about where particular thresholds lie, and in advance, the better.
Rational consistency is not just a desideratum, but a requirement, of
defensible moral as well as legal decisionmaking. Nonetheless, in
seeking advance specification of what sound moral judgment
requires, one cannot properly demand more precision than the nature

118.
119.
120.
121.

See DWORKIN, supra note 116, at 37–38, 67–68; SCANLON, supra note 117, at 64–72.
See Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, supra note 111, at 905–10.
RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 8–9 (1983).
Id. at 131.

FALLON IN PRINTER (MODIFIED FIRST) (DO NOT DELETE)

10/9/2013 3:59 PM

378

[Vol. 63:347

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
122

Almost invariably, real-world
of the subject matter permits.
problems will require assessments of likely consequences under
circumstances of greater or lesser uncertainty involving multiple
dimensions.
III. TOWARD A TWO-TIERED INTERPRETIVE THEORY
With Part II having sketched in conceptual terms how the
analogy of threshold deontology could help to inspire a two-tiered
theory of legal interpretation, I now want to discuss more concretely
what such a theory might look like. I state that ambition slightly
equivocally because it is important to distinguish between the concept
of a two-tiered theory, which is formal or abstract, and particular
versions of two-tiered theory, which are necessarily substantive. In
other words, there could, in principle, be a variety of two-tiered
interpretive theories. Although agreeing that legality operates on two
levels, the proponents of different versions of two-tiered theory might
differ about the circumstances under which ordinary interpretive
principles should yield and about what could ultimately be justified
under those circumstances. In this Part, my principal aim is to
elaborate the central questions that any substantive two-tiered theory
would need to address. But I shall also try to give a flavor of how twotiered analysis might work in practice by offering substantive
comment on both historical and contemporary examples of expansive
claims of executive power.
A. Principles of Ordinary Interpretation
Within a two-tiered framework, evaluation of any claim of
presidential authority properly begins with “ordinary” principles of
statutory and constitutional interpretation. As I have tried to make
clear, however, the formal or abstract idea of two-tiered interpretive
theory involves no specification of what those principles ought to be.
It says only that whatever principles anyone holds already require
supplementation by a set of extraordinary principles, framed for the
assessment of claims of executive power in great, exigent, or
emergency cases. Although taking people’s ordinary interpretive
theories as given, I assume, as I have said, that nearly everyone’s
122. Cf. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHAEN ETHICS, bk. I, at 2 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“Our discussion will be adequate if its degree of clarity
fits the subject matter; for we should not seek the same degree of exactness in all arguments
alike.”).
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theory will be consequence-sensitive to some extent. Accordingly, I
would expect the application of ordinary principles to leave the
president with impressively broad powers, wholly without regard to
those that could be justified only if extraordinary, second-tiered
principles applied. I shall return to this issue in Part IV. Nevertheless,
the powers that could plausibly be justified under any first-tier theory
would be less sweeping than those that the president has claimed
(without distinguishing between first- and second-tier cases) in the
past. Moreover, as Part IV will explain, the availability of
extraordinary, second-tier principles for truly exigent cases should
alleviate some of the pressure that currently exists to permit highly
expansive interpretations of presidential power pursuant to ostensibly
ordinary interpretive principles—regardless of the first-tier theory
that one embraces.
B. The Threshold Triggering Second-Tier Interpretive Principles
Just as threshold deontologists need to identify the thresholds
above which ordinarily applicable moral principles cease to determine
what conscientious moral agents ought to do, two-tiered legal theories
require judgments about the magnitude of the consequences needed
to justify deviations from ordinary interpretive principles. Some
defenders of extraordinary presidential emergency powers might limit
the occasions for their invocation to existential threats to the United
States as a democratic political community or, possibly in addition, to
123
imminent risks to very large numbers of American lives. Abraham
Lincoln would represent the paradigm of a president confronting an
existential threat. Tested against an existential threat requirement,
any other historical cases would raise questions of how immediate a
threat would need to be, or how low the odds of its realization would
have to fall, for it to fit the definition. For example, did Hitler’s
Germany pose an existential threat to the United States at the time of
Franklin Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bases deal in 1940?
My own judgment would be that to restrict justifications based
on practical imperatives exclusively to cases of demonstrably
existential threats would set the bar too high. For example, I think the
destroyers-for-bases deal should pass muster on grounds involving the

123. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 1290 (defending extraordinary presidential powers in
cases of “indispensable necessity” and identifying “national survival” and protection against
attacks that would threaten the nation’s capacity to provide continuing protection against
enemies as the only interests that “surely” come within that category).
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threat that a Nazi-dominated Europe would have posed to the
overall, long-term national interest, even if national survival was not
124
strictly at stake. To cite another example, the national interest in
extricating U.S. hostages from Iran in 1981, and in resolving the
surrounding crisis, seem to me to justify President Ronald Reagan’s
claim of authority—which I think would have been impossible to
sustain otherwise—to enter into an agreement nullifying pending suits
125
against Iran in U.S. courts.
Nevertheless, the destroyers-for-bases deal, in particular, may
help to illustrate the way in which even extraordinary claims of
presidential authority that are ultimately constitutionally justified
may have a dirty-handed aspect. During true emergencies, time
pressures will almost always make constitutional amendment
infeasible. But presidents, rather than asserting normally untenable
claims about the import of existing statutes, could often request that
Congress authorize steps that they think vital to the national interest.
In contrast with Abraham Lincoln’s situation at the outset of the Civil
War—when Congress was not in session—Franklin Roosevelt was in
a position to seek statutory authorization for a transfer of destroyers
to Britain, but he could not persuade Congress to relax statutory
126
restrictions on his powers. In making what in other circumstances
would have been the legally insupportable claim that no
congressional action was necessary, Roosevelt not only deviated from
normally applicable interpretive principles, but also violated ordinary
constitutional norms governing the distribution of power between
Congress and the president when a majority of Congress did not
agree that emergency justified his chosen course of action. In a sense
of the legal “ought” that does not wholly dissolve even when
impending consequences ultimately establish a president’s action as

124. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill maintained at the time that without the
destroyers, Britain might be unable to hold the English Channel and would be in peril of falling
to Hitler. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1044. “Roosevelt would later describe the
destroyer deal as the most important action in the reinforcement of the United States’s own
national defense since the Louisiana Purchase.” Id. at 1046.
125. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 658 (1981); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra
note 11, at 86 (noting that in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court construed a statute
“[e]nacted to regulate and constrain executive action during international economic crises . . . to
grant broad executive power”).
126. Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1045. President Roosevelt sought, and won,
congressional approval for aid to Britain after the 1940 elections. See SCHLESINGER, supra note
36, at 110.
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legally justified, presidents ought not arrogate to themselves powers
to override normally applicable and persisting constitutional norms.
C. Enduring Demands of Law Even in Emergency Conditions
A third, partially interconnected dimension along which the idea
of a two-tiered theory of legal interpretation requires specification
involves the limits on what can be justified as a matter of law even
under exigent circumstances. All proponents of two-tiered theories
127
should reject the propositions that emergency knows no law and
128
that in times of war, the laws go silent. Just as threshold deontology
is a theory about morality’s dictates in exigent circumstances, and not
a counsel to forsake morality when the costs become too high, twotiered theories of constitutional law remain such in extraordinary
cases. For example, the powers that two-tiered theory recognizes are
the powers of constitutionally established offices. Although
constitutional forms may require adaptation, they should not be
abandoned—as President Lincoln recognized when he sought afterthe-fact congressional ratification for most of the emergency steps
that he took at the beginning of the Civil War. Nevertheless,
proponents of two-tiered theories may reasonably disagree about
what becomes acceptable under emergency conditions.
An illustration may emerge from the notorious “torture memos”
129
of the Bush administration, produced at a time when executive
officials could plausibly have thought that the United States was
subject to exigent threat. Those memoranda advanced two lines of
argument. First, they defined the “torture” prohibited by federal
130
statutes and international treaties exceedingly narrowly. Second,
they maintained that Congress could not, in any event, validly restrict
the president from authorizing interrogational methods that he
131
thought necessary for national security.
127. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646–52 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (rejecting an argument predicated on the assumption that “necessity knows no
law”).
128. Cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
225 (1998) (“The laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat
different voice.”).
129. E.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
130. See id. at 173–99.
131. See id. at 203, 207.
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From the perspective of a two-tiered interpretive theory, the
most palpable error in the Bush administration’s analysis lay in its
proposed normalization of presidential authority to override
132
prohibitions that Congress had plainly intended to establish. Harder
questions would have arisen if the Bush administration had asserted
the more limited claim that the statutory prohibition against torture
would infringe inherent presidential powers as applied, for example,
to a case in which there was specific evidence of an impending
terrorist calamity, as well as strong reason to believe that a particular
detainee possessed relevant information, and all other possible means
of averting the disaster had been exhausted. In those hypothetical
circumstances, a two-tiered theory would need to take seriously the
possibility that exigency might justify a claim of inherent executive
authority that could not be justified otherwise.
To take an argument seriously is not, of course, necessarily to
embrace it. In a book entitled Because It Is Wrong, Professors Charles
Fried and Gregory Fried argue that torture is so inherently morally
evil that there could never be a moral or legal justification for
133
resorting to it; whatever other prohibitions might yield to exigency,
they maintain that the proscription against torture does not. Others
who interpret the Constitution in light of an analogy to two-track
moral theories might reach a different conclusion. For example,
Professor Walzer has argued that in a case in which interrogational
torture offered the last, best hope for avoiding a nearly certain
calamity, a morally conscientious official would be constrained to

132. The memoranda have been widely condemned. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 89, at
148–51; Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 199–207 (2010). The
Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility subsequently found that the analysis
in some of the legal opinions constituted “professional misconduct.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S
MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S
USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 254 (2009),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf. A reviewing
official rejected the finding of professional misconduct but agreed that the legal work was
“flawed” and reflected “poor judgment.” Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy
Att’y Gen., to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to
the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of
Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected
Terrorists 64–69 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAG
MargolisMemo100105.pdf.
133. FRIED & FRIED, supra note 106, at 145.
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acquire morally dirty hands. In such a case, the idea of a two-tiered
theory of legal interpretation frames a question the resolution of
which requires a further act of judgment concerning which reasonable
people will understandably disagree.
IV. THE PRESCRIPTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF TWO-TIERED THEORY
FOR THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF PAST EXECUTIVE PRECEDENTS
In the current state of American constitutional practice, a twotiered theory of executive authority cannot deliver on the promises
that I have made on its behalf unless it offers normatively attractive
prescriptions regarding what we ought to do, going forward, with past
executive precedents. If great cases have made bad law, or if they
have encouraged the development of an interpretive culture within
the executive branch in which executive precedents now give
plausible support to nearly any claim of national security authority
that the president might wish to make, how would the adoption of a
two-tiered theory alter the existing state of affairs?
In schematic terms, this question permits a plain, blunt answer:
two-tiered theory prescribes that we should begin immediately to
reassess old cases to determine whether they constitute precedents
entitled to guide thinking about new ones. In other words, we should
accord executive-branch precedents as much—and only as much—
135
precedential authority as a two-tiered theory entitles them to.
On one view, historical practice has validated a scope of
presidential authority, including interpretive authority, that now must
136
be accepted, even if it could not have been justified in the first
instance. But arguments to this effect claim too much. Although a
good legal theory must presumptively fit most (though not all)
137
judicial precedents,
unilateral executive judgments, which are
typically rendered by nonneutral decisionmakers without careful
testing through the adversary process, should trigger more critical
appraisal. One pertinent factor involves whether other branches have
134. See Walzer, supra note 13, at 166–68.
135. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 118–23 (4th prtg. 1978)
(discussing the need for legal theories to include a “theory of mistakes”).
136. See, e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
29, 33–35 (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) (describing but criticizing the view
that custom now vindicates claims of presidential authority to use military force prior to
congressional approval).
137. See supra note 16.
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approved—not merely tolerated—past, unilateral assertions of
138
executive authority. Another factor, which two-tiered theory also
emphasizes, involves the force of the arguments that either were or
retrospectively could be asserted in a particular precedent’s defense.
Although “it is folly to think a sound constitutional judgment can be
made . . . without facing up to what the historical practice between the
139
branches has actually shown,” mere recitations of what presidents
have done or asserted in the past cannot resolve the scope of
presidential and congressional war powers.
A. Identifying and Applying Valid Second-Tier Precedents
Within a two-tiered framework that reflects this attitude, I
believe that executive precedents can have at least a marginal
influence in determining when exigencies are sufficiently great to
warrant an invocation of second-tier principles. For example, I would
point to the general, retrospective approbation of President
Roosevelt’s destroyers-for-bases exchange as indicative that an
140
imminent, existential threat is not an absolute prerequisite.
Nevertheless, executive precedent cannot compromise the basic
architecture of two-tiered interpretive theory.
If executive precedents were parsed through the lens of twotiered theory, the most celebrated great cases of the American past—
including those involving Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt—would
cease to provide any foundation whatsoever for claims of executive
authority in relatively more mundane cases. In this respect, two-tiered
interpretive theory calls for a healthy revision within, but not a total
overhaul of, existing practice. For example, the Obama
administration has generally made selective decisions about which
precedents to rely on in defending its claims of executive prerogative.
In justifying its initial commitment of forces to the NATO operation
in Libya, it thus eschewed reliance not only on precedents set by
138. Although it is widely recognized that executive precedents take on elevated stature
when other branches have “acquiesced” in them, see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11, 613 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915),
acquiescence need not signify thoughtful endorsement on constitutional grounds, and
sometimes it does not even signal endorsement at all. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at
448 (observing that “where acquiescence is the touchstone of the analysis, the standard for
legislative acquiescence should be high”); Glennon, supra note 73, at 137–44 (discussing indicia
of acquiescence).
139. Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1100.
140. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
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Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt, but also on the dubious conclusion
reached by the Truman administration that it did not need
141
congressional authorization to enter the war in Korea.
An unarticulated insistence on distinguishing ordinary- from
extraordinary-tier cases may also underlie at least some of the
Justices’ reasoning in the Youngstown case. In defense of the
president’s authority to seize and operate the nation’s steel mills, the
Truman administration cited a number of past instances in which
142
presidents had asserted authority to seize property unilaterally. The
only honest distinction of some of the precedents, including three
seizures by President Roosevelt during the six months prior to Pearl
Harbor, may have been that the earlier cases involved a truly exigent
threat to national security, whereas the circumstances of Youngstown,
in which the president had an alternative, statutorily authorized
143
mechanism for averting a nationwide steel strike, did not. Twotiered theory would thus make explicit what Justice Black’s majority
opinion either left implicit or papered over entirely, even if it cannot
supply rule-like criteria for marking the divide between exigent and
nonexigent circumstances in a world in which knowledge of how the
144
future will unfold rarely approaches perfection.
If two-tiered theory’s prescription for precedent-parsing were
adopted, some past assertions of presidential authority that could be
justified only if assigned to the exigent, second-tier category—such as
President Truman’s initiation of U.S. involvement in the Korean
War—might pose testing issues. In asserting that if the Korean
precedent could be justified, it would need to be pursuant to secondtier reasoning, I assume, as most constitutional scholars have
141. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., supra note 63, at 12–13.
142. See, e.g., MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 154–58 (1977) (discussing the administration’s arguments); Patricia L.
Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233 (Christopher
H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (same).
143. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 33, at 362 (criticizing Justice Frankfurter’s concurring
opinion in Youngstown, which acknowledged the relevance of historical practice, for its failure
adequately to distinguish “[t]hese now embarrassing incidents [that] seemed precisely parallel to
what Truman had done”).
144. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952) (“It is said
that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of private business
enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby
lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the
powers vested by the Constitution ‘in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18)).
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concluded, that the Constitution at least normally does not authorize
the president to wage war unilaterally except in response to a sudden
145
attack. Nor, I would argue, could second-tier principles—which
reject the proposition that emergency and perceived emergency know
no law—justify a unilateral presidential prerogative to commit the
nation to a major armed conflict. However practically imperative war146
fighting might appear to the president, in Korea or elsewhere,
Congress’s solemn concurrence ought to be necessary before the
executive branch can commit the nation to protracted, large-scale
147
hostilities.
In any event, even if one thought that the imperative for the
United States to respond swiftly to an attack on South Korea justified
the Truman administration’s unilateral decision to rush troops into
148
battle under second-tier interpretive principles, that precedent
would provide no valid support for presidential claims of authority to
enter large-scale, protracted hostilities without congressional
authorization when ample time exists for Congress to deliberate and
act. Accordingly, the Korean War did not furnish a controlling
precedent for arguments by the George H.W. Bush administration
that the president could initiate and wage the first Persian Gulf War
149
without congressional authorization if he so chose. Nor could the
145. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. On the acknowledged authority of the
president to repel sudden attacks, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32–38 (1993); and Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233–36, 285 (2001).
146. See Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United
Nations, 81 GEO. L.J. 597, 623 (1993) (noting that the Truman administration “had little time to
wait” as “the military situation [of South Korea] deteriorated” in the face of a North Korean
attack).
147. See Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why
Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 887 (1996) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 20)
(emphasizing the importance of congressional authorization “to ensure American combat forces
that the country is behind them; to convey American resolve to adversaries as well as allies; and
to reduce the chances that Congress will precipitously undercut a deployment in the face of
adversity”).
148. Rather than relying on the arguably peculiar exigency of the situation, the State
Department memorandum defending the action, U.S. Dep’t of State, Authority of the President
To Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEP’T ST. BULL. 173 (1950), articulated the strong view that
the president, as the Commander in Chief, has “full control over the use” of the armed forces.
Id. at 173. In support, it cited numerous (smaller) conflicts in which the armed forces had been
sent abroad, without congressional authorization, “for protection purposes.” See id. at 177–78.
The memorandum also emphasized that important national interests—including the authority of
the United Nations—justified the operations. See id. at 174–77.
149. In testimony before Congress, then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney “pointed to
Korea in particular as an illustration of well-established principles concerning the president’s
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Korean precedent persuasively support the claim of the George W.
Bush administration that the president did not need congressional
150
approval before launching a war to topple Saddam Hussein.
A defensible version of two-tiered interpretive theory would also
give no cover to presidential claims that general and enduring threats
to national security—such as those attending the Cold War or the
War on Terror—suffice to authorize all actions the president might
151
think prudent or otherwise advisable. Within a two-tiered theory, a
general threat that justifies an extraordinary application of legal
norms in one situation may not warrant a comparably extraordinary
application of legal norms in another, even during the same period.
Whether the stakes are high enough and whether other,
straightforwardly lawful measures would suffice needs to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. The notions of dirty hands and of
constitutionally justified violations of ordinarily governing rules signal
that the deviations from baseline constitutional principles do not
merit either general or unconditional approbation, even in
threatening times.
B. Precedent and Presidential Authority in First-Tier Cases
It is a further question how to parse claims of executive authority
in the national security domain that depend on executive precedents
involving first- or ordinary-tier cases. Once analysis and argument
focus on first-tier principles and precedents—as two-tiered theory
demands that they typically should—two-tiered theory will frequently
not, by itself, furnish a determinate answer to the question whether
an assertion of unilateral executive authority is justified. As I have
emphasized, two-tiered theory operates as a supplement to whatever
first-tier theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation
adherents already embrace; it does not dictate a full set of first-tier
interpretive principles, including principles concerning the

authority to send U.S. forces to combat” and grouped that episode alongside smaller actions to
distill a legal rule that congressional authorization was unnecessary. Stromseth, supra note 146,
at 645 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options
and Implications, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 702
(1990) (statement of Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense)).
150. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 20, at 215–30.
151. In every year since 2001, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have declared
that the United States is in a state of emergency arising from terrorist threats. E.g.,
Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56517 (Sept. 12, 2012); see GOLDSMITH, supra note 21, at ix–x.
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significance of past executive precedent. As I shall explain, however,
two-tiered theory may carry implications about the need for line
drawing to enforce the structural distinction between normal and
exigent cases.
For my own part, applying my own first-tier interpretive theory, I
would interpret both Article II and the War Powers Resolution—
without need for reliance on extraordinary, emergency-based
principles—as giving the president latitude to take unilateral steps to
protect important U.S. interests through relatively modest, short-term
uses of military force. By requiring the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
hostilities after sixty days if Congress has not authorized a longer
involvement, and by authorizing an additional thirty-day extension
152
when necessary for the safety of U.S. forces, the War Powers
Resolution implicitly recognizes a presidential prerogative to conduct
153
military interventions of limited duration and short of war. I would
also interpret Article II as conferring presidential powers consistent
with what Professor John Hart Ely described as the “constitutional
understanding [that] was quite consistently honored from the framing
154
until 1950.” Pursuant to that understanding as Ely characterized it,
presidents could deploy troops abroad to protect U.S. interests when
they believed that immediate action was vital, and that major, longterm hostilities were unlikely to ensue, but “subject always to the core
command underlying the constitutional accommodation . . . that
[they] come to Congress for approval as soon as possible and
terminate military action in the event such approval is not
155
forthcoming.” Executive precedent is certainly consistent with, and

152. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
153. See FISHER, supra note 20, at 145 (describing the War Powers Resolution as
“recognizing that the President may use armed force for up to 90 days without seeking or
obtaining legislative authority”); cf. SCHLESINGER, supra note 36, at 434–35 (“Before the
passage of the resolution, unilateral presidential war was a matter of usurpation. Now, at least
for the first ninety days, it was a matter of law.”).
154. John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1379, 1388–89 (1988).
155. Id. at 1388–91; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 19, at 1056–57 (asserting the
existence of a prevailing understanding “[b]y the conclusion of the Clinton Administration” that
although presidents may commit troops in some situations risking hostilities, “any conflict of a
scale directly comparable to Korea or Vietnam must be carried out with legislative approval”).
The question whether that presidential power is subject to congressional curtailment has not
arisen and, in light of the War Powers Resolution, seems unlikely to arise.
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provides some support for, this conclusion. As Professor Curtis
Bradley and Dean Trevor Morrison have recognized, however, no
consensus exists about how precisely to characterize “the scope of the
President’s authority to initiate military conflicts without
congressional authorization” or about how far Congress should be
deemed to have acquiesced in many past assertions of executive
157
power.
Especially in the face of such uncertainty, two-tiered theory’s
recognition of a second tier of exceptional cases should reinforce the
conviction that there are and must be limits on what ordinary
interpretive principles can justify, lest the distinction between firstand second-tier cases prove pointless in practice. Taking seriously the
commitment to line drawing that two-tiered theory reflects, I find
unpersuasive the Obama administration’s claim that the deployment
of U.S. forces against the resisting Libyan military within Libyan
territory did not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of the
War Powers Resolution. Given both the War Powers Resolution and
Article II’s recognition of presidential authority to initiate modest,
short-term military interventions, I have no quarrel with the
administration’s position that the president acted permissibly in
commanding U.S. participation in NATO-led military operations in
Libya in the first instance or with its reliance on the precedents that it
158
cited. But even if past executive precedents have a limited capacity
to gloss statutory meaning, they could not, in my view, suffice to
establish the counterintuitive proposition—which State Department
Legal Advisor Koh sought to defend—that “hostilities” do not
necessarily exist within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution
even in circumstances marked by the presence of thousands of U.S.
159
ground troops, combat, casualties, and a high risk of escalation.
Even the more limited principle that Koh ultimately purported to
distill from past executive precedents and then to apply—finding an
absence of hostilities “when U.S. forces engage in a limited military
mission that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited risk

156. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 464 (“[T]he general consensus that Presidents
have some unilateral constitutional authority to use military force to protect or rescue U.S.
citizens abroad is based in large part on historical practice and understandings.”).
157. Id. at 465.
158. See supra notes 63, 66 and accompanying text.
159. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra
note 66, at 15 & nn.15–16.
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160

of serious escalation and employs limited military means” —imposes
narrower limits on the term than I believe that ordinary interpretive
161
principles will sustain. If steeled to stop great cases from making
bad law, we should be as resolute to prevent more ordinary cases
from doing so, especially when the ordinary cases involve executive
162
precedents, not clearly acquiesced in by Congress, that strain
legislative language beyond its common-sense meaning. In the
absence of sharply etched boundaries on the president’s power to
initiate military action, any erosion of the War Powers Resolution’s
durational limit is especially lamentable if, as two-tiered theory
affirms, significant restraints on presidential authority ought to be
163
maintained.
Others will of course disagree with my judgments about the
Obama administration’s actions in Libya—which, I hasten to add,
reflected policy aims that I applaud. In disagreeing, moreover, critics
may take issue not only with my ultimate legal conclusion, but also
with my suggestion that the structure of two-tiered interpretive theory
supports my line of reasoning. Acknowledging the scope that twotiered theory leaves for disagreement, especially insofar as it fails to
prescribe a full set of first-tier interpretive principles, I would insist
only that two-tier theory frames the right issues for debate. At the
very least, embrace of two-tiered theory would force those making
and disputing claims of executive authority to argue openly about
whether exigent necessity justifies a deviation from otherwiseapplicable legal norms, and, if not, about how much straining of those
norms is consistent with our first-tier commitment to the ideal of the

160. Id. at 9.
161. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 5, at 431 (“[T]he weight given to historical practice
varies inversely with the clarity of other sources . . . .”). Especially in the national security
domain, reasonable presidential interpretations of statutes should command deference. See Chi.
& S. Air Lines, Inc., v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (observing that military
and foreign policy decisions are “of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities,
nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry”). As the courts have recognized, however, a deferential
disposition does not always entail ultimate agreement. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 621–25 (2006) (rejecting a presidential interpretation of provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice in a case involving the use of military tribunals to try alleged war criminals).
162. Cf. Recent Administrative Interpretation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1546, 1552 (2012) (“[I]n
each of the examples Koh cited, the executive and Congress actively disputed the [War Powers
Resolution]’s application, or events resolved too quickly for the sixty-day clock to expire.”).
163. Cf. FISHER, supra note 20, at 132–33 (noting that the War Powers Resolution has
furnished a politically if not legally enforceable constraint on the duration of involvements in
hostilities).
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rule of law—under circumstances in which cases of truly exigent
necessity are already separately provided for.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have appealed to the analogy of threshold
deontology to argue in favor of a two-tiered theory of constitutional
and statutory interpretation in cases involving claims of presidential
power. Like morality, constitutional law incorporates principles that
can be in fundamental tension with one another. On the one hand,
the president is appropriately subject to constitutional and legal
constraints, even in cases in which those constraints produce adverse
consequences. Although applicable legal norms may be context- and
consequence-sensitive to a degree, they frequently restrict official
discretion to do what would be best under the circumstances, based
on the assumption that officials should be bound by norms from
which they cannot excuse themselves on a case-by-case basis, even to
promote the public good. On the other hand, it is a premise of
constitutional interpretation that the Constitution is not a suicide
pact. That dictum reflects a deeper recognition that those interpreting
and implementing the Constitution should respond to consequencebased imperatives to maintain the constitutional order and to
promote its most fundamental values, even when ordinary
interpretive principles would deny them authority to do so, in cases of
existential threat or when the stakes are otherwise exorbitantly high.
Analogously to the way in which threshold deontology holds that
otherwise inviolable moral principles can be overcome when
adherence to them would have catastrophic consequences, two-tiered
interpretive theory justifies the president in asserting otherwise
indefensible claims of executive power in extraordinary cases, but not
in ordinary ones. Like threshold deontology, however, two-tiered
interpretive theory permits consequentialist imperatives to override
otherwise inviolable norms only in narrowly defined circumstances.
Although the Constitution is not a suicide pact, neither does it license
substantially unrestricted executive power when nothing remotely
analogous to suicide, or its avoidance, is at stake. And even when
invocations of extraordinary interpretive principles can be justified,
two-tiered interpretive theory would insist that those invocations are
inherently dirty-handed. In a world in which presidential power has
too often tended to expand indiscriminately, two-tiered interpretive
theory furnishes a better conceptual, rhetorical, and political
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safeguard than we now have against the normalization of practices
that ought not become standard, even if they are justified in
extraordinary cases.

